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Me, myself and I: Non-collaborative customer behavior in service 





Purpose: This research focuses on the role of customer behavior in service outsourcing rela-
tionships that are governed by outcome-oriented contracts. It aims to explain how non-collab-
orative customer behavior impedes the effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracts to align 
the goals and incentives of the customer and service provider, and leads to service provider 
opportunism.  
Design/methodology/approach: Nine hypotheses are developed regarding customer behavior 
and the reaction of the service provider to this. These are tested using structural equation 
modelling with data from 213 service outsourcing relationships. 
Findings: Outcome-orientated contracts in service outsourcing may have unintended conse-
quences because they create value attribution ambiguity. This ambiguity induces non-collabo-
rative customer behavior, which, in turn, results in service provider opportunism. This reveals 
a paradox, where customer behavior aimed at curbing service provider opportunism instead 
induces such opportunism. This chain of effects can be counteracted by increased outcome at-
tributability, which reduces the ambiguity and, thus, the motivation for non-collaborative cus-
tomer behavior. 
Originality/value: This research extends the existing literature by stressing that non-collabo-
rative customer behavior is a key reason why outcome-oriented contracts fail in effectively 







The successful outsourcing of business services requires effective governance of the 
customer–service provider (SP) relationship (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, Wacker et al., 2016). 
One approach to relationship governance is outcome-oriented contracting, which is used in an 
increasing range of business service outsourcing deals, both in private and public-sector set-
tings (e.g., Caldwell and Howard, 2014, Essig et al., 2016). These contracts tie (at least part 
of) the payment of the SP to the customer’s desired outcomes (Kim et al., 2007). In this way 
they seek to align the goals and incentives of the two parties (Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) in 
order to prevent SP opportunism (Kim et al., 2007, Datta and Roy, 2011, Sumo et al., 2016b), 
which is known to reduce the performance of any business relationship (e.g., Williamson, 
1985, Wathne and Heide, 2000), and specifically that of service outsourcing partnerships 
(Wang, 2002, Das, 2004). 
However, empirical results regarding the implementation of outcome-oriented contracts 
are mixed. While some studies show that outcome-oriented contracts can lead to effective and 
efficient service provision (e.g., Datta and Roy, 2011, Sumo et al., 2016b), and mitigate op-
portunism (Hypko et al., 2010a), other studies show that these contracts fail to align goals and 
incentives, and trigger SP opportunism (e.g., Shen, 2003, Selviaridis and Norrman, 2015). 
Overall, it is still unclear why, or why not, outcome-oriented contracts are effective in govern-
ing service outsourcing relationships. 
The extant literature has focused on the SP’s behavior to better understand these issues, 
while neglecting the effects of outcome-oriented contracts on customer behavior. We provide 
a complementary perspective by putting customer behavior in the spotlight and positing that 
outcome-oriented contracts become ineffective and lead to SP opportunism when customers 
exhibit non-collaborative behavior.  
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Specifically, we argue that increasing outcome orientation in contracts (i.e., where a 
larger part of the payment is tied to the actual outcome) creates ambiguity regarding the ap-
propriation of the value that is co-created by the customer and the SP in the outsourcing rela-
tionship. We posit that this ambiguity will induce non-collaborative customer behavior to ap-
propriate more of the co-created value and to prevent the SP from receiving payments (e.g., 
bonuses) that are disproportionate to its efforts. Such non-collaborative customer behavior 
(which we dissect into three distinct elements) is perceived by the SP as non-legitimate 
(Dunfee et al., 1999) and results in SP opportunism (Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014). We 
further show that such negative relationship dynamics can be averted by the ability to clearly 
attribute outcomes to the input and effort of the involved parties (i.e., outcome attributability 
(Oflaç et al., 2012)), because this reduces ambiguity and limits the customer’s inclination to 
manifest non-collaborative behavior.  
Based on data from 213 service outsourcing relationships, our results extend the exist-
ing research on outcome-oriented contracting (e.g., Zu and Kaynak, 2012, Caldwell and 
Howard, 2014) by stressing the hitherto little-understood customer behavior under this con-
tract type. The study also suggests that increasing outcome orientation in formal contracts can 
undermine effective governance of outsourcing relationships (Wacker et al., 2016) in that it 
induces untrustworthy customer behavior.  
2 Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Outcome-oriented Contracts in Service Outsourcing 
The outcome-oriented contracting literature draws on Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989) to investigate the design of outsourcing contracts and their effectiveness in governing 
the customer–SP relationship (e.g., Hypko et al., 2010a, Essig et al., 2016). Hidden action as a 
core agency problem stems from information assymetry and the principal’s potential inability 
to verify agent behavior. The agent may act opportunistically and not perform the assigned 
5 
 
tasks according to the contractual specifications, since its preferences may be misaligned with 
the principal’s goals (Eisenhardt, 1989, Zu and Kaynak, 2012).  
To address potential agent opportunism, the principal can choose behavior-oriented con-
tracts, if agent behavior is observable and investment in behavior monitoring systems is effec-
tive. Alternatively, when observability is limited, outcome-oriented contracts can be chosen to 
align interests and prevent hidden action (Eisenhardt, 1989), as these contracts tie the SP’s 
payment to the outcomes requested by the customer, thereby incentivizing the SP to achieve 
the customer’s goals (Kim et al., 2007).  
Yet, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of such outcome-oriented contracts 
in governing service outsourcing relationships is mixed. Some studies are consistent with 
Agency Theory predictions, suggesting that outcome-oriented contracts result in alignment of 
goals and incentives (e.g., Ng et al., 2009, Datta and Roy, 2011, Sumo et al., 2016a), as attain-
ing the specified outcomes is desirable for both the customer (as this improves the customer’s 
business) and the SP (because of receiving larger payments) (Martin, 2007).  
Another research stream, however, points at the failure of outcome-oriented contracts in 
facilitating alignment, and the introduction of perverse incentives (see Selviaridis and 
Wynstra, 2015). Such literature paints a bleak picture by focusing on the unintended conse-
quences of outcome-oriented contracts in terms of inappropriate SP behavior and opportunism 
(Koning and Heinrich, 2013). SPs may misreport performance to avoid penalties and/or re-
ceive bonus payments (Hypko et al., 2010a), exhibit “cherry-picking” behavior (i.e., avoiding 
“hard-to-serve” customers) (Shen, 2003), seek external insurance coverage against potential 
penalty payments (Zybell, 2013), or even intentionally reduce service effort where the costs of 
such effort outweigh the costs of failure or the extra revenue tied to outcome achievement 
(Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015).  
Overall, prior research on the effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracts in governing 
service outsourcing relationships has focused on the SP and its behavior, while the role of the 
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customer’s behavior has been neglected. This is perhaps not surprising, given that this litera-
ture has mainly adopted an Agency Theory perspective that presents the customer as flawless 
principal and the SP as malicious agent requiring surveillance. Accordingly, the literature has 
stressed the importance of SP performance monitoring and management (e.g., Glas et al., 
2018). In contrast, we emphasize the effects that outcome-oriented contracts have on the cus-
tomer’s behavior. This focus is useful because co-production (and thus co-creation of value) 
is a key characteristic of service outsourcing that requires customer–SP collaboration (Randall 
et al., 2010, Ng et al., 2013). The customer plays an important role in service production and 
delivery, contributing critical input such as information and material resources (Sampson and 
Froehle, 2006). 
2.2 Ambiguity in Outcome-oriented Service Contracts 
The duality of the customer as recipient of the service and supplier of inputs has signifi-
cant implications for outcome-oriented contracting in that the achievement of service out-
comes depends not only on the SP’s inputs, but also on the quality of inputs provided by the 
customer (Sampson and Froehle, 2006). Thus, service co-production results in ambiguity con-
cerning inputs (i.e., who is responsible for which inputs), as the interfaces between the actors 
are permeable (Sampson and Spring, 2012).  
This input ambiguity is amplified in outcome-oriented contracts, with inputs being in-
separable and contestable (Selviaridis, 2016b). Additionally, outcome-oriented contracts en-
tail ambiguity regarding outcomes and their allocation, creating a value appropriation prob-
lem. As payments are not fixed upfront, but rather depend on the outcome, it remains ambigu-
ous until after service provision which exact outcome the SP will provide to the customer and 
how much the customer will actually pay to the SP (i.e., the financial outcome for the SP).  
Overall, this leads to a situation where the appropriation of value – the difference be-
tween the cost of the inputs and the monetary equivalent of the outcomes (Garcia‐Castro and 
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Aguilera, 2015) – is ambiguous with relation to both 1) the contribution (i.e., the inputs) of 
the SP and the customer to the achievement of co-produced outcomes, and 2) the legitimate 
claiming of the outcomes (Randall et al., 2010).  
2.3 The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Outcome Attributability on Ambiguity 
Profit maximization by the customer, or as Cox (2001) formulates it, the desire to make 
money, puts the focus on value appropriation in the business relationship (Cox, 2001). Conse-
quently, outcome orientation and outcome attributability, which both affect value appropria-
tion ambiguity, will strongly impact customer behavior (see Figure 1): The larger this ambi-
guity, the more it makes sense for the customer to try to appropriate more value itself and al-
low less value appropriation by the SP (by preventing SP free-riding). 
++++++_Insert_Figure_1_Approximately_Here_+++++++ 
2.3.1 Outcome Orientation  
Agency Theory contrasts behavior- and outcome-oriented contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In practice, however, contract choice is hardly ever binary, and outcome orientation in service 
contracts is mostly a matter of degree (Hypko et al., 2010b). Outcome-oriented specifications 
may be used in combination with input- or process-oriented ones, stressing that appropriate 
provider behavior (Martin, 2007) and performance incentive fees (bonus/penalties) can form a 
smaller or larger share of the provider’s total compensation (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). 
For the purposes of this study, outcome orientation is defined as the degree to which SP pay-
ments are dependent on achievement of specified outcomes and, thus, determined ex post. 
Outcome orientation increases value appropriation ambiguity, because of a larger de-
gree of ambiguity regarding both inputs and outcomes. Outcome orientation implies that the 
SP is free to choose the inputs (Sumo et al., 2016a). Furthermore, it means that a larger share 
of the total payments is ambiguous until after the service has been provided (because they are 
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contingent on the actual outcome) and that the ambiguity increases in terms of who can legiti-
mately claim (i.e., appropriate) the value co-created in the relationship (Randall et al., 2010).  
This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, as the underlying service contract exactly 
specifies which payment the SP will receive for each possible outcome. Yet, this specification 
cannot fully consider the inputs provided by the SP and the customer. It is possible that favor-
able outcomes were reached because of the customer (e.g., the customer provided significant 
help to reach the outcomes) or in spite of the customer (e.g., the customer provided unfavora-
ble service conditions by changing other interrelated processes). In the first case, the actual 
payment to the SP would be higher than the legitimate claim, and in the second case it would 
be lower. In both cases, the higher the share of variable payment, the higher the absolute dif-
ference between what is contractually paid and what is legitimate compensation. Overall, this 
situation arises because of co-production and illustrates how stronger outcome orientation in-
creases the value appropriation ambiguity. 
2.3.2 Outcome Attributability  
Outcome attributability refers to the transparency within the outsourcing relationship 
with regard to the locus of service-performance failures or achievements (Oflaç et al., 2012). 
High outcome attributability implies that outcomes are attributable to a specific party in-
volved in service co-production, or to a specific (uncontrollable) outside factor influencing 
service delivery (Oflaç et al., 2012, Selviaridis, 2016b). Or to put it simply, it is clear (i.e., can 
be easily determined) who is responsible (and to what degree) for the achieved outcomes.  
Outcome attributability is directly linked to, and reduces, the value appropriation ambi-
guity by providing transparency regarding the inputs made by both parties and their responsi-
bilities for achieving the outcomes. Therefore, outcome attributability clarifies legitimate 
value appropriation. As the inputs and effort of each party can be clearly traced and attributed 
(Oflaç et al., 2012) there is little room for interpretation or reason to contest (Selviaridis, 
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2016b). Furthermore, in such situations any unfavorable attribution of value can be chal-
lenged more easily, given the high transparency over the locus of outcome achievement. Con-
sequently, outcome attributability clarifies who is legitimized to appropriate the co-created 
value. 
This, in turn, reduces the scope for opportunism and free-riding, as it is more difficult 
for the SP to reduce effort and still obtain financial benefits (e.g., bonuses) by relying on the 
customer’s contribution (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014), as such behavior will be transparent 
to the customer. Conversely, the SP also feels more confident that it will not incur penalty 
payments for service delivery failures for which it is not responsible (Nullmeier et al., 2016). 
2.4 Reaction to Ambiguity in Outcome-oriented Service Contracts  
The value appropriation ambiguity has a strong behavioral impact. As the appropriated 
value is the difference between the benefits one party receives and the inputs it contributes in 
exchange, each party can try to influence the situation in its favor by reducing inputs to the 
value-creation process and by attempting to achieve more benefits from it. The customer can 
employ two general approaches to this: 1) behave opportunistically and therefore acquire 
more than the legitimate share of value; and 2) prevent the SP from free-riding and acquiring 
a larger share of value than is legitimate (i.e., not justified by the SP’s inputs and efforts).  
Customer opportunism refers to a behavior whereby the customer pursues its self-inter-
ests with guile and consciously takes advantage of the circumstances (Williamson, 1985). 
This includes putting its own interests first, and being less considerate of the SP’s interests 
and how these are impacted by the customer’s activities. Particularly when the outsourced ser-
vices are only a part of complex operations, many situations may lead to such customer be-
havior. For example, the customer may incentivize its own customers to reduce order-batch-
ing, resulting in more orders per day, for which the SP may not be equipped. This may ad-
versely affect the outcomes that determine payment to the SP. 
10 
 
Preventing free-riding refers to behavior whereby the customer takes action that disal-
lows the SP to take advantage of the situation. The free-riding problem is created in co-pro-
duction settings where the SP may opportunistically exploit the customer’s effort and receive 
full or even extra payment despite expending less-than-expected effort in achieving the con-
tracted outcomes (Koning and Heinrich, 2013). This even leads to the paradoxical situation 
where a customer has to pay twice for its efforts: first, by using resources to support the ser-
vice provision; and second, by paying more to the SP because of improved outcomes (result-
ing from the customer’s efforts to support the SP). Naturally, the customer wants to safeguard 
itself against provider opportunism and avoid situations in which the provider obtains benefits 
undeservedly (Datta and Roy, 2011). 
Putting effort into the two approaches that influence the value appropriation (i.e., own 
opportunism and preventing free-riding) only makes sense for the customer if the share of un-
allocated value is significant, and it becomes more attractive the larger the corresponding am-
biguity is. Consequently, we conclude that the larger the value appropriation ambiguity, the 
more intensive the customer’s efforts will be to influence value appropriation via own oppor-
tunism and preventing SP free-riding.  
2.5 Mechanisms to Deal with Ambiguity 
Our research posits that the customer tries to maximize its value appropriation from ser-
vice outsourcing by employing three mechanisms for its own opportunism and to prevent SP 
free-riding. These are all non-collaborative in nature: 1) exhibiting a non-benevolent, untrust-
worthy behavior toward the SP; 2) acting more hierarchically and limiting SP autonomy; and 
3) breaching the spirit of the outsourcing contract. 
2.5.1 Non-benevolent, Untrustworthy Customer Behavior 
As contracts cannot stipulate every possible contingency, relational governance mecha-
nisms are vital for successful relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, Roehrich and Lewis, 
11 
 
2014). According to Social Exchange Theory (SET), informal, social relations are embedded 
in economic exchanges (Granovetter, 1985, Griffith et al., 2006), thus creating a complex tan-
gle of formal and informal governance mechanisms (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). SET empha-
sizes the development and preservation of trust (e.g., Heide, 1994, Lusch and Brown, 1996) as 
a key relational mechanism, where trust is defined as “the confidence or belief that [a com-
pany] possesses about the honesty and benevolence of other partners” (Liu et al., 2009, p. 
296). In other words, trusting a partner means believing that this partner has no intention to 
cheat or defect, that it will behave benevolently (Nooteboom et al., 1997), and is genuinely 
concerned about its exchange partner, which is a key element of a collaborative working rela-
tionship (Doney and Cannon, 1997, Hill et al., 2009). Based on this notion, we focus on how 
benevolently the customer behaves as basis for the SP judging the customer’s trustworthiness.  
In service outsourcing, trustworthiness-as-benevolence translates to a customer refrain-
ing from opportunistic behavior (Gulati, 1995, Puranam and Vanneste, 2009), considering the 
goals and the success of the SP, and treating the SP fairly. For example, the customer provides 
accurate and timely demand forecasts, knowing the importance of this information for the 
SP’s operational planning (e.g., staffing throughout the week).  
When a customer tries to opportunistically exploit the ambiguity and to appropriate 
more value than legitimate, it manifests non-benevolent, untrustworthy behavior. The cus-
tomer does so by reducing its inputs and by disregarding the provider’s interests when making 
decisions, instead putting its own interests first to appropriate a larger share of value. A less 
benevolent customer also acts in a way that prevents (or at least reduces) free-riding by the 
SP. 
Meanwhile, a benevolent, trustworthy customer would help the SP in different ways, 
and be forthcoming and try to shape the context so that it also suits the interests of the SP; 
such behavior would make the service delivery easier for the provider. However, the SP could 
free-ride by reducing its own inputs and efforts while still receiving the same payment (for 
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which it would have to exert more effort with a less benevolent customer). Consequently, be-
nevolent customer behavior has the potential to backfire, when the customer effectively pays 
double by paying for the resources necessary to support the SP, and by paying the SP for 
achieving the predefined outcome levels.  
Larger value appropriation ambiguity resulting from increased outcome orientation ren-
ders opportunistic, non-benevolent behavior more appealing to the customer. As such behav-
ior allows the customer to appropriate more value, the customer will be more inclined to ex-
hibit such opportunistic behavior the more it can gain by it. The larger the ambiguity (as a re-
sult of increased outcome orientation), the more this is the case. Thus, we can conclude that 
increasing outcome orientation leads to non-benevolent, untrustworthy customer behavior. 
This effect of outcome orientation is counteracted by outcome attributability. High lev-
els of outcome attributability reduce ambiguity, as outlined earlier. As such, outcome attribut-
ability makes non-benevolent, opportunistic customer behavior less interesting because it re-
duces the share of the total value that is contestable, as inputs of both parties become highly 
transparent (Selviaridis, 2016b). In other words, in cases where it is easy to attribute con-
tracted outcomes to the inputs and efforts of the customer and SP (Oflaç et al., 2012), the cus-
tomer will find it less appealing to focus on its own interests, as the potential for increasing its 
own benefits is limited. Instead, the customer can now exhibit more benevolent, trustworthy 
behavior that cannot be exploited by the SP. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Outcome orientation in outsourcing increases non-benevolent, untrustworthy cus-
tomer behavior. 
H2a: Outcome attributability in outsourcing reduces non-benevolent, untrustworthy cus-
tomer behavior.  
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2.5.2 Customer Hierarchical Behavior  
One core idea of outcome-oriented contracting is that only outcomes, and not the pro-
cesses and inputs necessary to achieve those outcomes, are specified (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998, Sumo et al., 2016a). In other words, the provider is granted autonomy re-
garding the design and execution of the outsourced service (Sumo et al., 2016a) and has free-
dom during the day-to-day operations of the service delivery to choose which activities to en-
gage in and which resources to use (Johnson and Medcof, 2007, Wang et al., 2011). The un-
derlying logic is that the customer does not focus on the provider’s behavior (i.e., the pro-
cesses carried out for service provision), but only on the outcome. Service improvements are 
facilitated insofar as the provider has leeway in service provision decisions and can make the 
most of its expertise and creativity to achieve the specified outcomes (Martin, 2007). 
At the same time, specifying only the outcomes of service provision reduces the cus-
tomer’s control and creates potential for opportunistic SP behavior to appropriate more value. 
To counter such loss of control and to prevent free-riding, the customer may limit the SP’s au-
tonomy and choose hierarchical behavior toward the SP, giving clear directives regarding ser-
vice provision during contract execution. Such hierarchical (non-collaborative) customer be-
havior is characterized by inequality of the actors, where the customer is the superordinate, 
controlling the SP and restricting its autonomy (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). The customer 
does not view the SP as an equal business partner and does not integrate it when making deci-
sions, rather imposing directives and constraints (Zybell and Wallenburg, 2017). This runs 
counter to a collaborative relationship between companies. 
Enacting a more hierarchical behavior with strict and specific instructions and directives 
reduces the SP’s autonomy during contract execution (Sumo et al., 2016a), enabling the cus-
tomer to limit the SP’s scope of activities that could be used to exploit the situation and unde-
servedly appropriate value. Furthermore, establishing structures and rules gives the customer 
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more opportunities to exploit the SP (e.g., the customer specifies that data analysis for perfor-
mance-related payments is only conducted on its own system). Hierarchical behavior is an ad-
versarial action to seize a larger share of the value at the cost of the SP (Kim and Choi, 2015). 
It helps the customer to create more opportunities to exploit the SP and to capitalize on those 
opportunities, effectively forcing the SP to subscribe to the customer’s rules. This effect is 
amplified, as hierarchical customer behavior often involves a submissive mindset of the SP, 
leading to limited questioning of customer actions (Zybell and Wallenburg, 2017). 
As hierarchical behavior prevents provider free-riding and potentially allows the cus-
tomer to appropriate more value, the customer will be more inclined to exhibit this behavior 
the more it can gain by it. The larger the value appropriation ambiguity (as a result of in-
creased outcome orientation), the more this is the case. Thus, we can conclude that increased 
outcome orientation leads to more hierarchical customer behavior. 
In contrast, outcome attributability reduces hierarchical customer behavior, because it 
reduces ambiguity, as outlined earlier. This makes hierarchical behavior less interesting be-
cause the share of the contestable value is reduced, as the inputs of both parties and their link 
to outcomes are highly transparent (Oflaç et al., 2012, Selviaridis, 2016b). Thus, the potential 
for the customer to increase its own value appropriation through hierarchical behavior is lim-
ited. Instead, the customer can revert to less hierarchical behavior, granting more autonomy to 
the SP, consistent with the principal logic of outcome-oriented contracting (Sumo et al., 
2016a). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1b: Outcome orientation in outsourcing increases hierarchical customer behavior.  




2.5.3 Customer Breaching the Spirit of the Contract  
The contracting literature has long pointed out that any contract intended to govern a 
complex transaction will be incomplete (Hart and Moore, 1999). No formal contract can spec-
ify all potential situations and be understood without reference to the broader business rela-
tionship within which it is agreed and executed (Selviaridis, 2016a). The reference to the 
‘business relationship’ recognizes the importance of social relations, collaboration norms, 
trust and expectations that complement the formal rights and obligations emanating from the 
written legal documents (Collins, 1999). As such, any contract, in addition to the spelled-out 
terms, entails a spirit of what was intended when the exchange partners agreed to the business 
relationship (Collins, 1999). This spirit is specific to the individual relationship and based on 
a mutual understanding of the two parties regarding the relationship’s function and intentions. 
It entails unwritten promises and obligations that go beyond the letter of the contract. 
Customer breaching the spirit of the contract is defined as the extent to which the cus-
tomer acts against these unwritten promises and obligations, which does not necessitate vio-
lating the explicit clauses in the contract. In some cases the opposite is true, by insisting on 
the letter of the contract in order to legally, but not legitimately, appropriate value 
(Williamson, 2008). Breaching the spirit of the contract can be considered highly non-collab-
orative, as it violates the principles of any transaction and undermines trustworthiness. 
By not keeping promises, interpreting contractual terms differently from their original 
intention, and bending rules in its favor, the customer substantially increases its scope for 
value appropriation within the outsourcing relationship. It allows decreasing its own inputs 
and efforts without reducing its share of the outcomes, and further provides the basis to ne-
glect additional inputs and efforts made by the SP. Moreover, this behavior helps the cus-
tomer to limit SP free-riding. Often in service outsourcing, the customer tends to be in the 
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stronger position when many providers are available. Then, the customer can reshape the rules 
of the relationship and address the situations where SP free-riding is expected.  
As Williamson (2008) points out, breaching the spirit of the contract is more likely 
when the stakes are higher and the customer can gain more from such behavior. This is the 
case with increasing outcome orientation, which augments the value appropriation ambiguity 
and the stakes within the relationship (i.e., more to gain, but also more to lose). Consequently, 
we conclude that outcome orientation has a positive effect on breaching the spirit of the con-
tract, as it increases the customer’s potential to appropriate value by such behavior. 
Moreover, here outcome attributability serves as antagonist to the customer’s inclination 
to breach the spirit of the contract to benefit from a favorable interpretation of the contractual 
terms and conditions at the expense of the SP. There are two reasons for this. First and fore-
most, outcome attributability reduces the potential gain from such behavior, as it diminishes 
the ambiguity, as outlined earlier. As such, attributability fully (or at least partially) removes 
the incentive for non-collaborative customer behavior. Second, attributability of outcomes 
plays an important role during contract execution in outcome-oriented contracts whose design 
hardly ever specifies (contractually) the expected inputs, roles, and behavior of the customer 
in service provision, hence offering significant room for interpretation of contractual terms 
(Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014, Nullmeier et al., 2016). High levels of outcome attributability 
will increase transparency regarding the cause-and-effect-relationships in service delivery and 
therefore make it more difficult for customers to hide behind opaque external factors that are 
arguably the reason for deviations. Based on the above, we hypothesize: 
H1c: Outcome orientation in outsourcing increases customer breaching the spirit of the 
contract. 
H2c: Outcome attributability in outsourcing decreases customer breaching the spirit of 
the contract.  
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2.6 Perception of Non-Collaborative Customer Behavior Induces SP Opportunism  
One objective of outcome-oriented contracting is to limit SP opportunism (Hypko et al., 
2010a). Yet, as argued in the following, based on Social Contract Theory (Dunfee et al., 
1999), the three mechanisms that the customer employs to deal with value appropriation am-
biguity in outcome-oriented contracting actually induce SP opportunism.  
Social Contract Theory (Dunfee et al., 1999) builds on social contracts that are not le-
gally binding but refer to a common understanding of a larger group, and are defined as 
“norms, assumptions, and beliefs that [companies] conceive as fair and appropriate [i.e., legit-
imate] for parties involved in [outcome-based contracting] relationships” (Edwards and 
Karau, 2007, p. 67). As such, companies have an understanding (i.e., a social contract) of 
what is generally legitimate in a relationship and what is not. In contrast to the spirit of the 
contract and partner-related expectations regarding benevolent, trustworthy behavior, social 
contracts are not specific to the individual relationship between company A and B, but apply 
in the same way to all business relationships. Customer behavior experienced by the SP that is 
not endorsed by a social contract, or put differently, has no general legitimization, will – ac-
cording to Social Contract Theory – lead to SP “reactance” and increased, rather than re-
duced, SP opportunism (Heide et al., 2007, Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014). 
All three mechanisms (non-benevolent, untrustworthy behavior; hierarchical behavior; 
and breaching the contract’s spirit) can be considered not only non-collaborative, but also 
non-legitimate customer behavior from the SP’s perspective.  
As mentioned before, benevolent, trustworthy customer behavior refers to the cus-
tomer’s goodwill toward the SP and its interest in the SP’s welfare (Doney and Cannon, 
1997). As such, it is a key element of collaborative relationships (Hill et al., 2009). Moreover, 
as outcome-oriented contracts, following Agency Theory, tend to be used for less programma-
ble, more complex tasks, they should involve stronger customer–SP collaboration (Hypko et 
al., 2010a). Consequently, SPs can expect a more mutually benevolent, trusting relationship 
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compared to simple service transactions. Therefore, the stronger the non-benevolent, untrust-
worthy customer behavior, the less legitimate it will be from a SP’s perspective.  
The same holds true for customer hierarchical behavior. Outcome-oriented contracts 
generally specify desired outcomes rather than required processes and input (Bernheim and 
Whinston, 1998, Sumo et al., 2016a). In other words, outcome-oriented contracting grants the 
SP autonomy regarding service design and execution, which enables the SP to make the most 
of its expertise and creativity (Sumo et al., 2016a). Consequently, exhibiting hierarchical be-
havior in outcome-based contracting is not legitimate, and the more hierarchical the behavior, 
the less legitimate it will be perceived by the SP.  
Adhering to the spirit of the contract is deemed important in the execution of the con-
tract (Sumo et al., 2016a) and is expected by any party in any contractual setting. Because of 
the incomplete nature of the contract (Hart and Moore, 1999), what exactly constitutes a 
breach of the contract’s spirit can be subject to discussion. Yet, with respect to the SP’s ac-
tions, only the subjective SP perception matters, as it will judge the customer’s behavior and 
act according to its judgment.  
As all three customer behaviors are illegitimate, they will, according to Social Contract 
Theory, lead to reactance and increase SP opportunism (Wallenburg and Schäffler, 2014): 
H3a: Non-benevolent, untrustworthy customer behavior increases SP opportunism.  
H3b: Hierarchical customer behavior increases SP opportunism.  
H3c: Customer breaching the spirit of the contract increases SP opportunism. 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
The data used for hypotheses testing were collected via a web-based survey, with senior 
managers from logistics service providers (LSPs) in Germany as the key respondents, because 
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only the SP can validly report on the opportunism it exhibits, which is non-observable for its 
customer. Further, we chose to analyze the hypotheses across SPs to provide generalizable 
findings for the whole industry that are independent from idiosyncrasies of individual SPs. 
The alternative would have been to view a wide array of different customer relationships of 
one SP (a within-company analysis) to fully control for potential differences across SPs. 
Each respondent answered the survey for one specific relationship with one of its 
business customers, which they chose based on two requirements: the respondents had 
detailed knowledge of the relationship; and the business customer was relevant to the LSP (to 
exclude insignificant customers). 
The total sample comprised 2,203 contacts from a university database on German LSPs, 
which is a good representation of the underlying population of small, medium, and large 
LSPs. We received 231 responses, a satisfactory response rate of 10.49 per cent (Harman, 
1976, Wagner and Kemmerling, 2010, Ralston et al., 2015). Due to missing data, 18 
questionnaires were discarded. 73.4 percent of responses came from small and medium sized 
LSPs with fewer than 1,000 employees. The customers come from a broad range of industries, 
the largest being consumer goods and food (23.0%), automotive and aviation (20.7%), 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals and health care (18.8%), industrial goods and machinery (17.4%).  
3.2 Measurements 
The survey instrument was developed based on an extensive review of the literature. We 
ensured face and content validity, particularly for newly developed scales, by combining the 
literature review with the involvement of subject-matter experts (Dunn et al., 1994). We pilot-
tested the survey, which included both the assessment of the SP’s own behavior and how the 
SP perceives the customer behavior, with 18 logistics experts from academia and industry. 
Based on their assessment of clarity and readability, we revised the questionnaire iteratively 
until no further changes were suggested. Unless indicated otherwise, all items are 7-point 
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Likert scale statements anchored “1 = strongly disagree” and “7 = strongly agree” (see 
Appendix). 
Outcome orientation. The literature does not provide a scale to measure the intensity of 
outcome orientation. Therefore, a new 5-item scale was developed reflecting the degree to 
which the actual payment, as specified in the contract, depends on the generated outcomes, and 
to what extent bonuses and penalties are incorporated. 
Outcome attributability. While the concept of attributability has been extensively 
discussed in the outcome-oriented contracting literature (e.g., Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014, 
Nullmeier et al., 2016), so far, no corresponding measurement exists. The new 5-item 
measurement builds on the extant literature and captures how easily problems, performance 
deviations and performance improvements can be attributed to one of the involved parties, and 
how transparent the dependencies between these parties are. 
Non-benevolent, untrustworthy customer behavior. This construct is based on the work 
of Doney and Cannon (1997) and captures the benevolence domain of trust. It was adapted to 
the specific industry context of the study and one item was added from Hofer et al. (2012) to 
capture whether the customer treats the provider fairly. Hierarchical customer behavior. For 
this construct, we developed a 5-item scale measuring the extent to which the customer limits 
the SP’s autonomy and, from a superior position, gives instructions that the provider follows 
without questioning. Customer breaching the spirit of the contract. As no adequate measure-
ment existed, a 5-item scale was developed assessing whether the customer acts according to 
the initial intention of the contract, or deviates, for example, by interpreting terms differently 
than intended. 
Service provider opportunistic behavior. This measurement is based on Provan and 
Skinner (1989) and Knemeyer and Murphy (2004). For robustness testing, relationship 
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effectiveness was included as alternative outcome. It was measured based on Ruekert and 
Walker Jr (1987) whose scale has been adapted to the LSP context by Hofenk et al. (2011). 
Controls. For control purposes, the following variables were included in the model: SP 
size (i.e., number of employees); customer size relative to the SP; familiarity of the SP with the 
customer requirements; and outsourcing experience of the customer. 
3.3 Reliability and Validity 
Non-response bias was assessed by t-testing between early and late respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The analysis yielded no significant differences at p < 0.05, 
suggesting that nonresponse bias was not of concern for this study (Lambert and Harrington, 
1990, Wagner and Kemmerling, 2010). Regarding common method bias (CMB), we took 
preventative measures during data collection, and retrospective measures applying statistical 
tests. We ensured respondents’ anonymity and clarified that no wrong responses to survey 
questions existed (Podsakoff et al., 2003). After data collection, we applied Harman’s single-
factor test and used a marker variable to assess potential CMB. Harman’s single-factor test 
showed that 32.8 percent of the variance can be explained by a single factor (Harman, 1976). 
Following Lindell and Whitney (2001), we calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
between the marker variable “profit growth in comparison to competitors” and the other 
variables in the model, and did not find any significant correlations at p < 0.05. All test results 
suggest that common method bias was not of concern for this study. 
All values for Cronbach’s Alpha (Nunnally, 1978) and composite reliability (Bagozzi 
and Yi, 1988) for the purified scales exceeded 0.7 (Table 1), indicating high reliability (Hair 
et al., 2010). A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess convergent and 
discriminant validity, which indicated adequate fit: χ²/df = 1.87, CFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.92, 
RMSEA = 0.064, and SRMR = 0.060.  
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Convergent validity was assessed by analyzing standardized factor loadings and the 
average variance extracted (AVE). All factor loadings fell into the acceptable or desirable 
range (Hair et al., 2010). Furthermore, all AVEs exceeded the commonly accepted threshold 
of 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981); only the provider opportunistic behavior scale was slightly 
below, at 0.49. However, all other AVE and composite reliability values suggested acceptable 
validity of the model. 
Discriminant validity was assessed via the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). Table 1 shows the square root of the AVE on the diagonal, which exceeded 
all the inter-construct correlations provided in the corresponding rows and columns, 
indicating discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981, Hair et al., 2010). 
++++++_Insert_Table_1_Approximately_Here_+++++++ 
4 Results 
The hypotheses were tested via structural equation modeling in a multi-stage approach 
using AMOS 24 with maximum likelihood estimation. Covariance-based structural equation 
modeling is especially appropriate in cases such as ours, where the focus is on testing a 
hypothesized causal model that entails latent variables (Hair et al., 2012, Hair et al., 2017).  
In the first step, a controls only model was tested, where only the four controls were 
tested as antecedents to SP opportunism in order to establish a baseline. This model had 
sufficient fit, but only very low explanatory power (R² = 2.3%), indicating that the controls 
alone are only responsible for 2.3 percent of the experienced differences in SP opportunism. 
In the second step, the two contract-related factors outcome orientation and outcome 
attributability were added as antecedents to SP opportunism. The explanatory power increased 
by 12.4 percentage points and both factors showed significant impact on SP opportunism.  
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In the third step, the hypothesized model was tested with the three customer behavior 
constructs added as mediators. This change led to a substantial increase in explanatory power 
by 43.1 percentage points to 57.8 percent, indicating that this model is highly superior in 
explaining SP opportunism compared to the model without mediating variables.  
The fit for the model with the mediators was adequate: χ²/df = 1.80, CFI = 0.91, TLI = 
0.90, RMSEA = 0.061 and SRMR = 0.074, allowing conclusions regarding the hypotheses. 
The statistical results presented in Table 2 support all nine hypotheses. Outcome orientation 
significantly increases customer non-benevolence (0.15), customer hierarchical behavior 
(0.26) and breaching the spirit of the contract (0.25), supporting hypotheses H1a to H1c. Out-
come attributability has a significant counter-effect on customer non-benevolence (-0.24), 
customer hierarchical behavior (-0.20) and breaching the spirit of the contract (-0.29), sup-
porting hypotheses H2a to H2c. We also found that all three types of non-collaborative cus-
tomer behavior significantly increase provider opportunistic behavior (with standardized path 
coefficients of 0.22, 0.22, and 0.33 respectively), supporting hypotheses H3a to H3c.  
++++++_Insert_Table_2_Approximately_Here_+++++++ 
In a fourth step, the robustness of the proposed model with respect to context-
dependency was tested via multi-group analysis. Potential moderating effects of different 
variables were tested via chi-square difference tests where the path coefficients were 
restricted to be equal in both sub-groups. In all cases the path coefficients were not 
significantly moderated by these variables (p-value of significance given in brackets): the size 
of the SP (p = 0.38), the relative size of the customer compared to the SP (p = 0.58), the 
length of the contract in months/years (p = 0.29), whether the SP is a family business (p = 
0.11), and concentration of the customer base of the SP (p = 0.17). This underscores the 
context-related robustness of the hypothesized model and serves as further support for 
hypotheses 1 to 3. 
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As further test of the robustness of the conceptual model, we analyzed the model with 
relationship effectiveness (i.e., how effectively the two parties are working together) – as 
judged by the LSP – as an alternative outcome measure instead of SP opportunism. This 
model has a similar fit: χ²/df = 1.67, CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.056 and SRMR = 
0.071 and shows customer non-collaborative behavior also to have a negative effect on 
relationship effectiveness. Further, the model exhibited substantial explanatory power (R² = 
61%). This emphasizes the central role of customer behavior in the effectiveness of outcome-
oriented contracts. 
5 Discussion  
5.1 Results Interpretation and Research Implications  
The results of the study extend existing research by stressing that the customer’s behav-
ior undermines the effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracts to align customer and SP 
goals and incentives and, thus, to prevent SP opportunism. Contrary to the focus of the extant 
literature on SP behavior and potential opportunism (e.g., Hypko et al., 2010b, Zu and 
Kaynak, 2012, Sumo et al., 2016b), our research highlights non-collaborative customer be-
havior to be a main source of ineffectiveness in outcome-oriented contracting by serving as a 
key mediator between the degree of outcome orientation in contracts and SP opportunism. 
This is underscored by the substantial increase in R² from 14.7 to 57.8 percent when including 
the mediating variables, and the fact that the results show to be independent of different con-
textual variables.  
Based on these results, our study responds to recent calls to focus on customer behavior 
and its bearing on the effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracting (Ng et al., 2013, Essig et 
al., 2016). Specifically, we stress that non-collaborative customer behavior is triggered by in-
creasing outcome orientation in service outsourcing contracts and the resulting value appro-
priation ambiguity as consequence of input and outcome ambiguity (Sampson and Froehle, 
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2006). As outcome orientation in contracts increases, customers exhibit non-collaborative be-
havior to appropriate a higher share of the value from the outsourcing relationship through 
their own opportunism and by preventing the SP from free-riding and receiving rewards that 
are not proportionate to the expended effort. Consistent with Social Contract Theory, this cus-
tomer behavior, which is not only non-collaborative but also non-legitimate, in turn, leads to 
SP opportunistic behavior.  
These results also reveal a paradox: customer behavior that is intended to curb SP free-
riding (e.g., via detailed specifications and work instructions) instead appears to induce SP 
opportunistic behavior. This paradox adds to the existing literature by stressing the customer’s 
egoistic, untrustworthy behavior. The role of the customer’s behavior has been downplayed in 
extant research, which suggests that inappropriate contract design (leading to perverse incen-
tives) is the main reason why outcome-oriented contracts may result in SP opportunism and 
win–lose, or even lose–lose, outsourcing relationships (Koning and Heinrich, 2013, 
Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). Relating to Kim and Choi's (2015) supplier relationship ty-
pology, we find that outcome-oriented contracting may lead to a “sticky relationship” – a 
close but adversarial relationship, where the more powerful party (customer) must, because of 
its own actions, be cautious of the opportunism of the weaker party (SP). 
In addition, our study contributes to the outcome-oriented contracting literature by 
demonstrating how outcome attributability helps to attenuate non-collaborative customer be-
havior and consequently SP opportunism in service outsourcing relationships. As compared to 
previous research focusing on how outcome attributability influences SP behavior (e.g., Oflaç 
et al., 2012), we examine the impact of outcome attributability on customer behavior. In par-
ticular, we find that high levels of outcome attributability reduce ambiguity in service out-
sourcing as the transparency regarding the distribution of value arising from outcome achieve-
ment increases. In such cases the customer is less inclined to exhibit non-collaborative 
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behavior (e.g., breaching the spirit of the contract), which in turn tends to attenuate the SP’s 
opportunism.  
These results also underscore a positive role of outcome attributability in relation to the 
effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracts. This is different from existing research focusing 
on the negative connotations of outcome attributability with respect to the adoption and suc-
cessful implementation of outcome-oriented contracts (see Nullmeier et al., 2016), for exam-
ple, outcome attributability-related challenges contributing to SP reluctance to bear the finan-
cial risks induced by outcome-oriented contracts (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014). 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on the interplay of contractual and rela-
tional governance mechanisms (e.g., Roehrich and Lewis, 2014, Cao and Lumineau, 2015, 
Wacker et al., 2016) by highlighting that increasing outcome orientation in formal contracts is 
detrimental to benevolent customer behavior and trust (Nooteboom et al., 1997), which is a 
vital element in this type of contract (see Ng et al., 2009). We find that (increasing) outcome 
orientation in contracts results in the customer manifesting non-benevolent, untrustworthy be-
havior, and breaching the spirit of the contract. This is unlike a customer behavior which, in 
line with SET, would emphasize trust development (Liu et al., 2009). Thus, our study sug-
gests that outcome-orientation as a formal contractual governance element hinders, rather than 
complements trust (Puranam and Vanneste, 2009) and can undermine effectiveness in out-
sourcing relationships (Wacker et al., 2016).  
5.2 Managerial Implications 
Our results offer managerial insights into the effectiveness of outcome-oriented con-
tracts in governing service outsourcing relationships. The study helps customer companies to 
better understand how their own behavior may contribute to the failure of outcome-oriented 
contracts to produce the desired results in terms of goal and incentive alignment. Customers 
should be aware that their non-collaborative behavior amplifies, rather than attenuates, SP 
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opportunism. Investing in and nurturing trust and collaborative behavior via a different mana-
gerial mindset (Zybell and Wallenburg, 2017) would potentially help to counter some of the 
challenges associated with increasing outcome orientation in formal contracts (see also 
Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
Another lever to prevent negative relationship dynamics is outcome attributability, 
which is found to be a key counteracting factor to non-collaborative customer behavior. This 
implies that customer and SP managers should strive for high outcome attributability to foster 
a collaborative relationship and minimize potential opportunism. This can be done, for in-
stance, by investing in detailed performance measurement systems that clearly monitor the 
causes of service delivery failures and achievements, as well as the service inputs contributed 
by each relevant party. 
From a SP perspective, understanding the rationale for non-collaborative customer be-
havior helps to be selective in terms of which customers are suitable for outcome-oriented 
contracts. Customers exhibiting collaborative behavior should be prioritized, as it is more 
likely that outcome-oriented service contracts will be effective with this type of customer.  
5.3 Limitations and Further Research 
This paper provides important insights into (non-collaborative) customer behavior and 
its role in relation to the effectiveness of outcome-oriented contracts in service outsourcing. 
However, the study has certain limitations that should be addressed through further research.  
First, our argumentation is based on the premise that attributing more of the co-created 
value is of relevance to the customer. While this will most often be the case when outcome-
oriented contracts are negotiated, it will not be the case when the overall financial volume of 
the outsourced services is very small. In the latter case, the customer may not “care” suffi-
ciently about the co-created value to engage in specific value attribution behavior.   
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Second, as our data were collected in Germany only, the results might not reflect out-
sourcing relationship dynamics in other cultural contexts. In addition, our study focuses on lo-
gistics services. Although this industry serves as a suitable example to study the effectiveness 
of outcome-oriented contracts, and hence we expect our results to be highly transferable to 
other types of business service featuring powerful customers, future empirical studies cover-
ing multiple service industries and countries would increase the generalizability of the find-
ings.  
Third, this study relies on the SP perspective. Therefore, it was only possible to consider 
the customer behavior as it was perceived by the SP. Here, it would be fruitful to also con-
sider the customer perspective and investigate to which extent the customer is actually aware 
of how its behavior is perceived. In addition, the study is limited in that data was cross-sec-
tional. As such, it is unclear how quickly the perception of non-collaborative customer behav-
ior leads the SP to behave opportunistically. To address these limitations, we encourage quali-
tative research designs utilizing longitudinal case studies or interview studies. These would 
allow deepening the understanding of the role of contracting with respect to customer-SP rela-
tionship dynamics and would complement the survey results by triangulating findings and en-
hancing their validity, thereby alleviating typical concerns regarding single-respondent sur-
veys.   
 Finally, our study stresses the positive role of outcome attributability in increasing the 
customer’s inclination to collaborate with the SP under an outcome-oriented contract. Future 
research should examine other factors that can complement outcome attributability in prevent-
ing, or at least mitigating, non-collaborative customer behavior and the SP’s opportunism that 
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Appendix: Measurement Scales 
 Construct/item Mean SD 
 
Outcome orientation * (new developed scale) 




Based on agreed performance indicators, a bonus or penalty is determined 
that has a strong influence on the overall compensation. 
2.68 1.975 
2 Our compensation is generally highly performance-related.** 3.93 2.040 
3 
 
The quality of our performance delivery has a strong influence on the actual 









In cases of underperformance, we lose a large share of our margin or even 
make a loss. 
2.92 1.877 
 
Outcome attributability * (new developed scale) 




If deviations from the desired performance occur, it can easily be determined 
whether our company, our customer or another company is responsible. 
5.29 1.485 
2 When issues arise, it can easily be determined which party is responsible. 5.11 1.480 




Dependencies between the customer and us (and possibly other firms) are 









Non-benevolent customer behavior * (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 









When making important decisions, this customer also considers our wel-
fare.** (reverse coded) 
4.13 1.626 
3 We trust this customer keeps our best interests in mind. (reverse coded) 4.12 1.729 
4 The customer generally treats us fairly. (reverse coded) 4.96 1.453 
 
Hierarchical customer behavior * (new developed scale) 




The customer gives us instructions that we as the service provider follow 
without discussion.** 
4.24 1.612 
2 In this business relationship, we do not interact on an equal footing.  3.46 1.902 
3 We are heavily restricted in our actions by this customer.  3.49 1.779 
4 
 
We are very rarely involved in the relevant decision-making processes of the 
customer. 
4.07 1.816 
5 The customer frequently takes a strong position toward us. 4.13 1.829 
 
* Items are measured on a 7-point Likert-scale, with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree 
** items dropped during scale refinement 
SD = standard deviation; CR = composite reliability, CA = Cronbach’s alpha, AVE = average variance extracted 





 Construct/item (continued) Mean SD 
 
Customer breaching spirit of the contract behavior * (new developed scale) 




The customer's behavior does not comply with what was intended with the 
agreed contract.  
2.44 1.573 
2 The customer does not act sincerely toward us. 2.38 1.603 
3 
 
The customer very often acts to its own advantage, instead of acting as it 




The customer does not keep generally accepted tenets that would be suita-





As soon as the customer has the feeling that we earn above average, con-




Service provider opportunistic behavior * (Provan and Skinner, 1989) 




Sometimes we present facts to this customer in such a way that we look 
slightly better than we actually are. 
3.00 1.687 
2 We do anything within our means that helps further our own interests.** 4.45 1.612 
3 Complete honesty does not pay when dealing with this customer.  3.18 1.934 
4 
 





We have not always provided the customer with a completely truthful picture 
of our business operation.  
2.41 1.501 
 
Relationship effectiveness* (Ruekert and Walker, 1987; Hofenk et al. 2011)  
CR = 0.93, CA = 0.93, AVE = 0.76 
  
1 We have a very effective working relationship with this client. 5.26 1.295 
2 
 
Overall, we are very satisfied with the working relationship with this client 
during the last 6 months.  
5.35 1.438 
3 We feel that the working relationship with this client is highly productive.  5.23 1.415 
4 
 
The time and effort spent in developing and maintaining the working relation-
ship with this client is in any case worthwhile. 
5.79 1.302 






Logistics service provider size 
How many employees did your company employ on average in 2014 (includ-
ing possible subcontracted workers)? 







Customer size (relative to logistics service provider) 
Please assess the customer’s size based on total revenue compared to your 
company. 







Familiarity with the customer 
How familiar was your company at the beginning of the contract with the 
specific requirements of this customer (e.g., due to a prior business relation-
ship)? 




Customer outsourcing experience * 
This customer is very experienced with outsourcing. 
5.20 1.712 
 
* Items are measured on a 7-point Likert-scale, with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree 
** items dropped during scale refinement 












TABLE 1: MEASUREMENT RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
  Construct  CA   CR  AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Outcome orientation 0.85 0.84 0.59 0.77           
2 Outcome attributability 0.85 0.86 0.60 -0.03 0.77         
3 Customer non-benevolent be-
havior  
0.84 0.85 0.64 0.16 -0.24 -0.80       
4 Customer hierarchical  
behavior 
0.86 0.85 0.60 0.26 -0.20 0.70 0.77     
5 Customer breaching the spirit of 
the contract behavior 
0.90 0.89 0.64 0.25 -0.29 0.69 0.67 0.80   
6 Service provider opportunistic 
behavior 
0.78 0.80 0.49 0.34 -0.15 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.70 
 
CA = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance extracted; the diagonal provides 









Structural path Stand. path co-
efficients 
p-values 
H1a (-) Outcome orientation → cust. non-benevolent behavior   0.15   0.044 
H1b (+) Outcome orientation → cust. hierarchical behavior   0.26   0.001 
H1c (+) Outcome orientation → cust. breaching the spirit of the contract beh.   0.25   0.001 
H2a (+) Outcome attributability → cust. non-benevolent behavior  -0.24   0.001 
H2b (-) Outcome attributability → cust. hierarchical behavior  -0.20   0.009 
H2c (-) Outcome attributability → cust. breaching the spirit of the contract beh.  -0.29   0.000 
H3a (-) Cust. non-benevolent behavior → SP opportunistic behavior    0.22   0.028 
H3b (+) Cust. hierarchical behavior → SP opportunistic behavior   0.22   0.028 
H3c (+) Cust. breaching the spirit of the contract beh. → SP opportunistic beh.   0.33   0.000 
 Outcome orientation     → SP opportunistic behavior   0.16   0.011 
 Outcome attributability → SP opportunistic behavior   0.04 (n.s.)   0.510 
 Controls   
 SP size  -0.13   0.040 
 Customer size (relative to SP)  -0.15 (n.s.)   0.057 
 SP familiarity with the customer   0.15   0.017 
 Customer outsourcing experience   0.06 (n.s.)   0.390 
 
